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Zoe Lefkofridi/Sylvia Kritzinger (Vienna)
Battles Fought in the EP Arena: Developments in National Parties’ 
Euromanifestos 
Aufgrund der fortschreitenden europäischen Integration seit den 1990er Jahren wird die 
nationale Politik unvermeidlich immer öfters mit dem Thema „Europa“ konfrontiert. Der 
Forschungsbereich „Europäisierung“ konzentriert sich daher darauf, die Effekte von euro-
päischer Integration auf nationale politische System, ihre Institutionen und Akteure zu un-
tersuchen. Innerhalb dieses Forschungszweiges interessiert uns nun das Verhalten der nati-
onalen Parteien im Zuge von Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament (EP). Anhand von nati-
onalem Parteienwettbewerb bei EP-Wahlen untersuchen wir empirisch, ob Parteien einem 
Re-Politisierungs-Prozess unterliegen, indem sie die EP-Arena dazu nutzen, um über Euro-
pa und europäische Politikfelder zu diskutieren. Folgende Forschungsfragen leiten dabei 
unser Interesse: Welche Art von Wahlkämpfen können wir in der EP-Arena beobachten? 
Finden die Wahldebatten in einem europäischen oder nationalen Kontext statt?  Außerdem: 
Was sind die Inhalte dieses Wettbewerbs in der EP-Arena? Welche Themen dominieren die 
EP-Wahldebatten in den verschiedenen Mitgliedstaaten der EU und welche Positionen 
vertreten die Parteien dabei? Wir untersuchen nationale Parteien in unterschiedlichen EU-
Mitgliedstaaten über Zeit, um deren Salienz sowie ihre Positionen gegenüber europäischen 
policy- und polity-Bereichen zu erfassen. Wir verwenden als Daten die Europawahlprogram-
me der österreichischen, britischen, niederländischen, griechischen, spanischen und schwe-
dischen Parteien zu den EP-Wahlen 1994/1996, 1999 und 2004. Unsere Untersuchungen 
ergeben, dass eine Europäisierung von Parteien nur teilweise stattgefunden hat. 
Keywords:  political parties, Europeanization, Euromanifestos, politicization 
politische Parteien, Europäisierung, Euromanifestos, Politisierung 
1.  Introduction1
Through their elected members in the European Parliament (MEPs), half a billion Europeans 
“can be involved in marking out their political vision for Europe” (European Parliament 2008). 
Yet, studies of European Parliament (EP) elections sketch a gloomier picture regarding the role, 
function and importance of these elections. Most importantly, despite gradual empowerment of 
the EP through successive treaties (Maastricht 1992; Amsterdam 1997; Nice 2001), voters’ turn-
out in EP elections has been steadily declining, and political parties seem to rank the European 
arena very low in their priorities. 
Inquiries about the EP contest make part of a larger body of literature, which investigates 
voters’ attitudes and behavior, in the US and Europe. This literature distinguishes between dif-
ferent2 types of elections. To illustrate, scholars who conceive elections as high/low stimulant in 
the US context (Campbell 1960) and as first/second order in the European context (e.g. Reif/
Schmitt 1980; Marsh 1998),3 explore voters’ behavior across electoral arenas. As Hix et al. ex-
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plain, the main argument of EP electoral research is that they “have been essentially ‘second 
order contests’4: fought by national parties (and covered by the national media) largely on na-
tional issues rather than on European integration” (2003, 194). Explicitly or implicitly, party 
behavior and competition in the European arena are therefore held responsible for aspects of the 
second order phenomenon; however, most research in the field focuses on voters rather than 
parties. So, in this paper we aim for an understanding of party behavior in EP elections to sup-
plement findings regarding voters’ behavior.
We are interested in how national parties treat the European arena and what kind of battles 
they fight there. More explicitly, we inquire, firstly, whether political parties have become aware 
of the purpose of the new arena. If so, secondly, we examine whether and how parties compete 
in this new electoral arena. 
We take Mair’s thesis on the waning of competition “through Europe, by Europe” (2000; 
2004; 2006; 2007) as our point of departure and explore the context and the grounds of national 
parties’ competition in EP elections. Hence, the present paper sketches party competition in the 
EP elections as comprising two elements: the context (European vs. national) in which the elec-
toral debate takes place and the content of this debate. Such a study inevitably locates itself in 
the Europeanization literature, which researches the effects of European integration on national 
political systems, as well as the actors and institutions in these systems. So far, scholarly work 
has mainly focused on national parties’ organizational aspects when dealing with effects of Eu-
ropean integration (e.g. Poguntke et al. 2007; Raunio 2002) widely neglecting substantive 
analysis on parties’ European policy positions. We intend to fill this gap in the literature through 
an analysis of national parties’ positions on the general pro/anti EU dimension but also on dif-
ferent EU polity and policy domains. For the purposes of our analysis, we rely on Euromanifes-
to-data for six EU member states to examine on which grounds national parties compete in EP 
elections. This data reports the themes addressed by parties in EP elections and thus allows re-
tracing processes of party competition. 
The paper is structured as follows: firstly, we define party Europeanization and outline 
theory-driven expectations regarding the impact of European integration on national political 
parties’ competition. Thereby, we focus on salience of Europe in EP elections, which we link to 
relevant assumptions of the second order theory. Furthermore, we review Mair’s arguments (2000; 
2004; 2006; 2007) with regard to the attenuation of policy competition as well as of opposition 
within the EU polity. Secondly, we elaborate on our measurement instruments and the data used 
to explore empirically the context of EP elections and processes of politicization in Austria, Great 
Britain, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Thirdly, we discuss our results and conclude 
by summarizing our findings and their relevance to ongoing scholarly debates. 
2.  Party Competition and European Integration
Political parties define their interests and pursue their goals according to a given setting. Stated 
policy positions of actors, for example, are located in “a practical political and institutional 
context” (Laver 2001, 69). European integration provides parties with a new institutional envi-
ronment and a new policy arena (Hix/Goetz 2000). Developments in the polity dimension (e.g. 
the introduction of qualified majority voting or increased powers of the EP) as well as in the 
policy dimension of European integration (e.g. EU-wide harmonization of a policy, new EU 
competences in a policy sector) constitute the “European context” of politics in the member 
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states. Since the 1990s, the pace of integration has increased to an extent “that the impact of 
European level decisions on the choices available in national political systems is too evident to 
ignore” (Hix/Goetz 2000, 2). Equally important, the Union attempted to draft a Constitution and 
experienced the greatest enlargement in its history: ten more members acceded, while others are 
on the waiting list. Thus, the more integration moves on, it has the potential to alter the ‘structure 
of political opportunities’ (Schlesinger 1985) for national parties in the member states. Yet, stu-
dents of European integration have paid little attention to its effects on political cleavages, elec-
tions, voters, political parties, party competition, party systems and patterns of democratic le-
gitimation (Hix/Goetz 2000, 15). For this reason, the growing literature on the Europeanization 
of national politics (e.g. Ladrech 2002; Pennings 2006; Kriesi 2006) explores such effects – along 
with responses to developments at the EU level.
“Broadly” speaking, “Europeanization” refers to domestic change triggered by European 
integration (Vink 2003) be it related to policy, polity or politics (Börzel/Risse 2003). Mair un-
derstands Europeanization as a factor that is “external to the national experience or as occurring 
when ‘something in national political systems is affected by something European’” (2006, 3f.). 
Meanwhile, Ladrech regards party Europeanization as a response to a challenge, “whether of 
marginal degree such as developing or building relationships with recently introduced actors and 
institutions, or more significantly to the relevance of an existing organization and its ability to 
attain certain indispensable goals” (2002, 393). Following Lefkofridi (2008), we understand 
party Europeanization as a by-product of a dynamic relationship between European integration 
and domestic politics, which manifests itself in different degrees across time and parties. Party 
Europeanization may range from party awareness of the European context (Europeanization I) 
to specific action induced by this context (Europeanization II) (Lefkofridi 2008). Firstly, we as-
sess party awareness of the European context by looking at how present/absent this context is 
from the EP electoral debate.5 Secondly, we understand party competition on European policy- 
and polity-related issue areas as a form of “party action”, which is induced by the European 
context. This two-level measurement will indicate if and how political parties compete in the 
European context, and, as a result, which kind of Europeanization can we detect amongst differ-
ent parties. In what follows, we refine these ideas and link them to the second order as well as 
to the politicization theses. 
2.1.	Europe	in	European	elections:	towards	the	forefront	or	still	in	the	shadows?	
Following Ferrara and Weishaupt (2004), we reckon that our analysis of parties in EP elections 
should address claims of the second order theory; although this theory intends to explain the 
behavior of voters, it makes important assumptions about the behavior of parties in EP elections. 
At the aftermath of the first direct elections to the European Parliament, Reif and Schmitt (1980) 
conceptualized EP elections as “second order” national elections, namely elections that are 
dominated by another, more important political arena. This latter arena is termed “first order” 
because there is more at stake. More specifically, the second order concept implies that EP elec-
tions are inconsequential “beauty contests” for national parties (van der Brug et al. 2007), while 
national elections in EU member states are first order events, since they can bring about alterna-
tion in executive power. In this view, EP elections serve as markers for the standing of parties 
and their programs (Franklin 2005). In agreement with this line of thinking, therefore, the na-
tional context should haunt European elections, which would be fought as a “re-run” of (Hix 
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1997) or a “prova generale” for national elections. It follows that parties’ arguments would be 
located mainly in a domestic rather than in a European context. 
Therefore, we ask: how do parties structure the electoral debate in European elections? Do 
they place their political arguments increasingly in a European context as the process of Euro-
pean integration moves on? Or does the EP debate prove impervious to developments at the 
European level? 
We approach these questions by looking at the salience structure of party arguments. In 
general, salience matters in political competition, assuming that “people take more notice of 
positions on issues they feel are more salient” (Laver 2001, 66). Furthermore, the strategic 
maneuverability of parties, the scarcity of resources, the time and communication channels as 
well as the limited attention span of voters (Sjöblom 1983) determine parties’ choices regarding 
the priority of some issues over others. In this paper, we use the term “salience” in a slightly 
different way, as we do not measure whether and to which extent single European positions have 
been put forward by parties. Instead, “salience” – as it is used here – measures the extent to which 
parties embed their arguments in a European context. In this manner, salience implies the degree 
of emphasis placed on the European context in general. Consequently, if Europe appears to be 
“salient” in EP elections, parties are aware of its growing importance; in other words, parties 
take Europe more seriously (Kritzinger/Michalowitz 2005) and tap the EP electoral arena for 
debating it. On the contrary, if EP elections are not about Europe despite the increase of EU 
policy scope and of EU institutions’ powers, parties fail to become conscious of the European 
context as well as of their role in this context. 
2.2.	Party	Action:	De-politicization	at	the	national	level,	re-politicization	at	the	
European	level?	
Salience of Europe can only tell us a part of the story about party behavior in elections to the 
European Parliament. Besides the context, we are also interested in party competition, in terms 
of analyzing the EP electoral debate’s content. So far, research interested in national party com-
petition and European integration has investigated the relationship between parties’ positions on 
the Left/Right and pro/anti-European integration axes (e.g. Marks/Wilson 1999; Hooghe et al. 
2002; Marks et al. 2006). Their findings suggest that, in general, parties have incentives to un-
derestimate European issues and structure competition “along the more familiar and safer socio-
economic cleavage” (Mattila/Raunio 2006, 428).
Taking into account these findings, we are further interested in the actual content of parties’ 
issue contestation in the EP. The substance of the EP contest is all the more important in respect 
of Mair’s (2000; 2004; 2006; 2007) argument that EU level decision-making contributes to the 
hollowing out of competition between parties at the national level. Firstly, he points out that 
Europe has limited the policy space available for parties to compete against each other through 
the EU acquis and the harmonization of policies. In addition, despite variation in the way differ-
ent countries interpret the demands for convergence, he highlights that within country variation 
– “at least across the mainstream” – is absent (Mair 2007). Secondly, through the delegation of 
decision-making authority to non-majoritarian institutions (e.g. European Central Bank) and 
regulatory agencies (e.g. Europol), Europe reduces the policy instruments and the policy reper-
toire at the disposal of national parties. And while it is hard to seek votes by opposing agencies 
or experts, Europe also “forbids” standard policy practices of the past which disrupt the function 
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of the single market. This set of limits results in the shrinking of political competition between 
national parties (Mair 2000).6 Mair (2007) also claims that due to the EU’s design, it is almost 
impossible to organize opposition within the EU polity in the “classical sense” (Kirchheimer, 
1957), referring to opposition as articulated by non-incumbent parties directed at the policies 
pursued by governing parties. What is more, the system’s failure to allow for such opposition is 
likely to lead to the elimination of opposition within the EU polity. Moreover, he argues that this 
systemic failure could also lead to the mobilization of an opposition of principle directed against 
the EU polity. 
Hence, European integration brings about the de-politicization of the policy-making process 
at the domestic level, while “it fails to compensate for this reduction by any commensurate re-
politicization at the European level” (Mair 2007, 15). Mair (2004; 2007) depicts two dimensions 
of political contestation, namely the “Europeanization dimension” and the “functional dimen-
sion”. The former refers to the form and scope of the increasingly institutionalized European 
Union political system; parties would effectively contest this dimension in the national arena, 
because this arena has the authority over constitutional and institutional issues. The latter concerns 
the policy areas, which have been already transferred to the EU level but raise disagreements 
about approach and priorities; although a debate on the functional dimension could take place in 
the national elections, it would be particularly meaningful in EP elections, as there is where the 
main competences of the EP lie (Mair 2007). Mair (2000; 2007) explains that part of the de-
politicization problem is the fact that parties contest the wrong issues in the wrong arena. 
In light of these arguments, which, admittedly, have paramount normative repercussions for 
the effectiveness of elections as channels of representation in our democracies, an exploration 
of the content of party competition in EP elections becomes essential. From this point forward, 
we are interested in the following questions: If competition is hollowed-out at the national level, 
do parties make an effort towards re-politicization at the European level? So, what kinds of bat-
tles are actually fought in the European arena? Do parties debate European policy or polity issues? 
Is this competition reinforcing politicization or rather the opposite?
3.  Data and Measurement 
For an empirical analysis of the above arguments, we rely on parties’ electoral manifestos. 
Party manifestos are key central statements of party positions and thus constitute genuine docu-
ments to measure salience and positions of parties on specific issues within and across countries 
(e.g. Ray 2007; 2003; Kritzinger et al. 2004; Binder/Wüst 2004; Pennings 2002; Hooghe/Marks 
1999). What is more, parties publish their manifestos before each election, which allows for a 
study of salience of Europe over time. Besides, a party manifesto is the final version of a docu-
ment composed through a series of formal processes (as specified by party rules). Manifestos 
constitute authoritative statements of policy, whose character is collective, i.e. they represent the 
whole party (Volkens 2001). No other data source represents views of the party as an organization 
(Budge 2001). 
As our research focuses exclusively on European elections, we measure salience of Europe 
based on the Euromanifesto-dataset by the Mannheim Research Group. Unlike the data from the 
“Comparative Manifesto Group” which handle national manifesto data (e.g. Pennings 2002), this 
dataset contains manifestos of national parties that have been created especially for the EP-
elections.7 Thus, we can use them to analyze whether the political competition of national parties 
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takes place in a national or a European context, as well as what exactly is contested and what are 
parties’ positions. 
It should be underlined that if EP elections are not about Europe, then parties are not yet 
aware of the role, function and importance of this electoral arena. Such lack of awareness may 
have been “normal” when the EP was mostly a consultative body with no real powers. However, 
the Maastricht treaty led to a substantive change of EP’s legislative powers by involving it 
largely in policy-making of many important issues of European integration. Also, the introduction 
of new decision-making procedures (e.g. codecision) boosted the systemic role played by the EP 
in the EU polity. As Maurer (1999) illustrates, the proportion of policy areas where the EP was 
not at all involved in policy-making declined from 72% (in the original EEC) to 40% in the post-
Maastricht EC. Accordingly, we focus on manifestos produced for EP elections in the post-
Maastricht period to gauge whether and to what extent parties attended European stimuli. Thus, 
our main hypothesis is that parties’ EP debate in the post-Maastricht era is likely to be located 
in a European context. To examine this hypothesis, and consequently, party awareness of the 
European context (Europeanization I) we measure the salience parties assign to the national and 
the European levels. The Euromanifesto-dataset contains codes, which include salience measures 
for each political level. 
To analyze politicization as party action (Europeanization II) we explore the content of EP 
contestation and proceed in two steps: firstly, we use parties’ general EU-position on a pro/anti-
Europe dimension for each electoral year based on the respective coding provided by the dataset 
to figure out whether, in general, parties use the European political space for political competi-
tion. Secondly, based on the former analysis, we dig into the substance of political competition 
in the EP arena by looking at parties’ EU-positions in different issue domains. Thereby we are 
interested in: (1) EU policy issue areas and (2) EU polity issue areas (i.e. the institutional archi-
tecture) of the EU. The inclusion of both groups allows examining simultaneously whether (and 
which) policy issues are politicized and to what extent (irrelevant) polity issues are debated. 
Within the first group, we can distinguish between the policy domains that have been trans-
ferred to the European level such as the Single Market, EMU, Agriculture, and general eco-
nomic issues (EU-Economy) and those for which the national level is still competent (Migration, 
Militarism, Welfare, Education). This distinction is important, as according to Mair, little atten-
tion has been made to control for the effects of European integration “by distinguishing between 
those issue areas in which Europe has become the principal authoritative voice and those in which 
national politics – and hence national political competition – continues to play a decisive role” 
(2006, 13). Within the second group, we include issue domains that focus on the institutional 
set-up of the European integration process (Constitutionalism, Balance between the national and 
the European level, Competences of EU-institutions, Satisfaction with EU-democracy).8 Follow-
ing Mair (2000; 2007), parties are likely to emphasize polity issues and de-emphasize policy 
issues. 
In conformity with our definition of Europeanization, low salience of Europe in the post-
Maastricht Euro-manifestos will be indicative of generally low party awareness of European 
developments (Europeanization I), while low emphasis on European policies will illustrate lack 
of action induced by the European context (Europeanization II).
We explore six member states in order to get a picture of national parties’ debate in EP 
elections: Austria, Great Britain, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. The selection of 
these countries is justified on various grounds. As electoral systems are major determinants of 
party competition, we firstly consider the potential effects they could have on the parties under 
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study. Like in all EU member states, EP elections in the selected countries are held under the 
electoral system of proportional representation (PR)9, albeit with slight variations.10 Yet, the 
electoral systems used in national elections across the EU vary. Parties face different incentives 
(and rewards) in majoritarian systems with two-party competition than in consensus systems 
with multi-party competition: political outcomes (e.g. office benefits, materialization of policy 
promises) are straightforward in the former systems and less certain in the latter systems. In this 
respect, there exist similarities and differences in terms of national elections’ outcomes among 
the countries under investigation. For example, single parties form cabinets in Great Britain, 
Greece and (mainly also in) Spain; coalitions of parties govern in Austria, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden (Lijphart 1999). As a result, for British, Greek (and probably also Spanish) parties, there 
is a significant difference between national and EP elections in terms of outcomes and importance. 
This also is why a refined version of the second-order theory (van der Eijk et al. 1996) postulates 
that EP elections are “more second order” in countries with two-party competition than in those 
with multi-party competition. To control for possible effects the different systems might have on 
party behavior in EP competition, we put forward a corollary hypothesis: parties in majoritarian 
systems are less likely to conduct the EP debate in a European context than are parties in con-
sensus democracies; therefore, our case selection includes countries using different electoral 
systems in national elections.11
Secondly, according to Goetz’s (2006) thesis on “clustered Europeanization”, differences 
in Europeanization can be explained through the “relative time of accession”, which refers to the 
phase of integration and/or the country’s internal political and economic development at the time 
of accession. The countries we explore joined the EU at distinct phases of European integration. 
Austria and Sweden acceded in 1995, namely in the post-Maastricht period, when EU legislation 
was much more visible in citizens’ daily life than in the past. On the contrary, all other countries 
joined the EU when the acquis was still in an infant phase compared to 1995. While the Nether-
lands makes part of the founding countries (1952), Great Britain, Greece and Spain acceded in 
1973, 1981 and 1986 respectively. Back then, there were not so many European policies to debate. 
To explore whether timing of accession plays a role regarding the extent to which parties locate 
their EP debate in a European context and re-politicize depoliticized policies, we additionally 
hypothesize that the later a country joined the EU, the more likely that Europe is present in the 
European elections’ debates.
Furthermore, we consider the countries’ domestic development at the time of accession. As 
Goetz points out, countries joining the EU with a consolidated set of institutions are “well-placed 
to take on the role of policy-shapers” (2006, 7). On the one hand, the Netherlands, Great Britain, 
Austria and Sweden joined the EU as mature liberal democracies with a developed market 
economy, whereas Greek and Spanish accessions coincided with processes of democratization. 
On the other hand, emerging from a dictatorship, Greece and Spain also lacked a powerful civil 
society leading to the expectation that substantial discussions about Europe might be missing. 
Finally, we hypothesize that countries with high levels of internal political and economic devel-
opment are more likely to debate about “Europe” in European elections. 
4.  Political Competition in the European Contest: the Results
In this section, we present our findings on party Europeanization regarding awareness and action, 
gathered from Euromanifesto-data, for six countries. We first look at the context used by politi-
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cal parties in the different election years, before going deeper into the content of competition in 
terms of de-politicization/re-politicization.
4.1.	The	Context	of	the	EP	Battles
Looking at how much salience parties attributed to the national and European contexts, two dif-
ferent pictures emerge from the countries under investigation. In the first set of countries (Austria, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and Spain) political parties situate their electoral debate very strongly 
in the European setting, whereas Euromanifestos of the second set of countries (Greece and Great 
Britain) exhibit that the national milieu plays a dominant role (see Figures 1 and 2). Regarding 
the former, with the exception of a few parties, parties’ arguments are clearly located in the 
European context and only a minority of their statements refers to the national setting.12 Thus, 
parties’ electoral debates indicate awareness of the European context. Moreover, this trend in-
creases as European integration moves on, which indicates that party debates might be influenced 
by ongoing developments at the European level. 
Figure	1:	The European Context of the Parties’ Battles
Regarding the second set of countries, we observe that the context of the electoral debate is 
mainly national. Unlike in the first set, here the national setting is quite central in EP elections. 
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Hence, we draw a differential picture for these two cases. Firstly, the way parties frame their 
arguments is not systematic throughout time. Rather, we observe fluctuation regarding the rela-
tive presence of the national and European contexts from one election to the other. Secondly, 
Greek and British parties’ electoral debate seems to be unreceptive to developments at the Eu-
ropean level since the national context dominates their EP debates. These findings are consistent 
with the second order literature, which posits EP elections as subjugated by the national contest. 
In other words, the dominance of the national frame indicates that European elections in Greece 
and Great Britain are fought as a “prova generale” for or a “re-run”13 of national elections. 
The different treatment of EP elections in the studied countries thus supports the refined 
version of second order theory, which states that it makes more sense to talk about European 
elections as second order elections in majoritarian systems (see Greece and Great Britain) – 
rather than in multiparty systems (van der Eijk et al. 1996). However, the present data refutes 
our hypotheses relating to temporality: neither the time of accession nor the internal political and 
economic developments seem to be of importance.
To sum up, we generally observe party competition in a European setting: parties seem to 
be aware of the post-Maastricht European context. Consequently, we can state that Europeaniza-
tion in terms of awareness is existent amongst the examined national political parties. Yet, in 
some countries, salience of Europe is low leading to less Europeanized party competition. 
4.2.	The	Content	of	the	EP	Battles	on	the	Pro/Anti	Dimension	
To explore the content of political competition in European elections we adopt a twofold ap-
proach. Firstly, we analyze competition on a pro/anti-European integration dimension to under-
Figure	2:	The National Context of the Parties’ Battles
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stand whether and how parties generally use the European political space. Secondly, we proceed 
to an analysis of positions in different policy and polity issue domains. This second step allows 
scrutinizing whether EP competition on each of the issue domains under study becomes de-po-
liticized or re-politicized, and, accordingly, whether Europeanization in terms of action takes 
place. 
Firstly, what do results on the pro/anti European dimension show for each of the six coun-
tries? The Austrian Euromanifestos reveal that, throughout time, the two major parties SPÖ and 
ÖVP advocate generally pro-European positions, with the ÖVP being especially Euro-enthusi-
astic. In the interim, the two smaller parties FPÖ and the Greens display different positions and 
major variations over time: on the one hand, the FPÖ has a general anti-European position, which 
it weakened for the 2004 election. On the other hand, the Greens, an anti-European party in 1996, 
later converted into a pro-European party, and even outnumbered the SPÖ in their pro-European 
stances. 
Figure	3:	Pro/Anti-European Positions in Austria
The Greek situation is more or less similar to the Austrian one. The two large parties alternating 
in government, namely ND and PASOK, consistently express positive stances toward the EU. 
The two smaller parties SYN and KKE are less supportive of European integration than the 
mainstream parties are; in particular, KKE conveys repeatedly very strong anti-European posi-
tions. 
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Figure	4:	Pro/Anti-European Positions in Greece
Likewise, almost all Swedish parties (including the two major ones, MSP and SAP) feature 
positive stances towards Europe. Yet, the Swedish Social Democrats are more reserved than 
other social democratic parties are. In addition, the MSP watered down its pro-EU stances in 2004. 
Meanwhile, the Greens and the VP generally communicate negative positions on Europe. 
Figure	5:	Pro/Anti-European Positions in Sweden
In the Netherlands, the two major parties (CDA and PvdA) also display positive positions towards 
Europe. Other Dutch parties, however, share this characteristic: in 2004, all parties possessed 
positive European positions. In the past, the Socialists (SP) and the Christian Union/Radical Re-
formed Party (CU/SGP) used to have (pronounced) negative EU-stances. The Netherlands consti-
tutes another case, where some parties switched from anti- to pro-European positions over time. 
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Figure	6:	Pro/Anti-European Positions in the Netherlands
Spanish parties are almost identical to the Dutch: we can observe only positive EU-attitudes – 
with the two main parties (PSOE and PP) being particularly Euro-enthusiastic. Thus, the overall 
picture from Spanish EP debates is that parties do not present Europe negatively to their vot-
ers. 
Figure	7:	Pro/Anti-European Positions in Spain
Finally, British parties compose the most fluctuating picture. Among them, the LDP is the only 
party with stable positive positions and the Greens the only with firm negative positions. In the 
meantime, the other parties’ positions on the pro/anti-EU dimension move quite substantially: 
Labour becomes much more Euro-enthusiastic over time, while the Conservatives change from 
a pro-European position to a strong anti-European one. Also, the Scottish National Party, which 
started out in 1994 as a Euro-enthusiast, became more moderate in the course of the years.14 
	 	 Battles	fought	in	the	EP	arena	 285
Figure	8:	Pro/Anti-European Positions in Great Britain
The conclusions we can draw from this analysis are twofold. Firstly, mainstream parties’ posi-
tions on the issue of European integration move towards convergence.15 Nonetheless, there is 
variation among the pro-Europeanists, both within countries and within party families. Variations 
within countries are a first indication that parties use the European political space to adopt dif-
ferent positions in the pro-anti Europe dimension of political competition in EP elections. Re-
garding variations within party families, we observe obvious distances in parties’ positions 
vis-à-vis European integration among both conservative and social democratic parties. In gen-
eral, conservative parties seem to possess stronger pro-European positions, while social democrats 
are more frugal in their pro-European statements (with the exceptions of PSOE in Spain and 
Labour in Great Britain).
Secondly, the positions of non-mainstream parties’ Euromanifestos on the pro/anti spectrum 
show greater diversity. On the one hand, data on Austrian Greens, Dutch Socialists and the CU/
SGP demonstrates a boost of pro-EU positions over time. On the other hand, the Greek SYN, 
the British Conservatives and the Scottish National Party manifest themselves as less pro-Euro-
pean/more anti-European. Lastly, parties on the extreme poles (e.g. FPÖ, KKE, VP, UKIP) adopt 
negative positions on the pro/anti-dimension of European integration. 
As indicated by the analysis so far, parties seem to use the political space for competition 
at the European level, by adopting different positions towards the European integration process, 
which, moreover, vary across time. We could preliminarily conclude that Europeanization in 
terms of action occurs. Nevertheless, to get a more robust picture of the content of competition 
in the European arena, we need to look more thoroughly into single policy and polity areas. 
4.3.	The	Content	of	the	Battles	in	issue	domains:	Hide	and	seek	across	electoral	
arenas	
In a next step, we analyze the detailed domain positions16 of parties, according to the codes re-
ferred to in the data and measurement section. We analyze these positions by calculating means 
and standard deviations (see Schmitt/Thomassen 1999) for each party across time, in order to 
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grasp how political competition is structured in the EP battle. Tables 2 to 7 in the Appendix17 
report our findings. 
What do results on means and standard deviations tell us? Firstly, parties in the countries 
under study possess different stances on various European policy and polity issue domains (see 
Table 1), and secondly, their attitudes mostly vary over time. Parties do not possess fixed posi-
tions; rather, they seem to be in search of positions in the European political space – probably 
due to the ongoing developments at the European level. However, it is interesting to observe that 
the major parties (SPÖ-ÖVP; PASOK-ND; PP-PSOE; CVA-PvdA; SAP-MSP; Labour) possess 
almost solely positive stances in all categories.18 These findings are in accordance with Mair’s 
(2007) argument about the “mainstream consensus”. What is more, we notice that, in the case of 
non-mainstream parties, positive stances also prevail in all categories. Additionally, parties em-
phasize the same issue domains in the EP competition. These results indicate that, if we take a 
closer look at EP elections and go beyond the general pro/anti-EU dimension, parties do not use 
the European space to compete against their opponents: not only do positive positions dominate 
in all categories but also the same emphasis is reported.19 
In this respect, exceptions are the Austrian Greens, the British Greens and some regional 
Spanish parties (e.g. EA, IU). On the one hand, they utter negative stances in some policy areas; 
on the other hand, they generally adopt positive positions with regard to the institutional archi-
tecture of European integration. This indicates a more reflective approach towards the European 
polity and policies: despite being pro-polity, they are critical on policies. The reverse is true for 
the British Conservatives, who possess positive stances in policy fields but negative attitudes 
towards polity-related issue areas. 
Finally, parties at the extreme poles feature negative positions in both polity and policy 
issue categories. Parties such as the Austrian FPÖ, the Swedish VP and MPG, the Greek KKE, 
the British UKIP and the Dutch SP possess predominantly negative stances in the various domains. 
Eventually, we need to point out parties do not mention certain categories at all. In other words, 
parties are very selective with regard to the issue domains discussed in EP elections, which results 






Positive SPÖ, ÖVP, PASOK, ND, PP PSOE, CVA, 
PvdA, SAP, MSP, Labour, etc.
Austrian Greens, British Greens,  
EU, IU
Negative British Conservatives FPÖ, VP, MPG, KKE, UKIP, SP
Hence, by analyzing our findings, we argue that most (especially large) parties adopt positions, 
which reflect movements towards the “EU accord”. Nonetheless, small parties are more reflective 
vis-à-vis European policies (Austrian Greens, Spanish EA and IU) or even anti-systemic (FPÖ, 
VP, KKE, MPG, UKIP, SP).20 
Equally important, our results confirm the hypothesis (Mair 2000; 2004; 2006; 2007) that 
parties focus on polity rather than policy issue domains. In general, parties in the six countries 
devote quite some time debating the division of competences between the national and the Eu-
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ropean level and democracy in the EU despite the inappropriateness of this electoral arena. We 
can interpret this trend as a sign of de-politicization. 
Looking at those policy domains that have already been transferred to the European level, 
we observe differences between countries. In Austria, Greece and Spain EU-policy domains are 
hardly discussed. That said, Spanish regional parties, along with British, Dutch and Swedish 
parties use EU-economy issues extensively in their political competition. Strikingly, agriculture 
is not mentioned at all. Re-politicization is occurring partially and within tight limits. 
Surprisingly, we observe that some parties locate specific policy areas in the European 
context, despite the fact that the competences for these policies still lie at the national level. For 
instance, there is a discussion on policies such as education, welfare (childcare, pension, social 
housing, etc.), and most importantly, migration, where the EU has no competence yet. This find-
ing is particularly interesting if compared to Pennings’ (2006, 263) cross-national investigation 
of national manifestos, which reveals that references to Europe occur much less in cases of edu-
cation and social security. The re-distribution of economic welfare, Pennings (2006, 265) argues, 
“in the form of public goods and services [...] is a national affair, and not much interference from 
the EU is accepted”. Apparently, if we shift the focus to individual parties, we notice that some 
parties debate exactly these „primarily national“ issues in EP elections, and indeed not in a na-
tional but in a European context. In more detail, Austrian SPÖ, Swedish SAP, Greek SYN and 
the Spanish CIU, IU and PNV introduce welfare issues in the EU political competition. All 
Swedish parties, the Dutch D66 and GL, the British LDP and Greens contest migration, while 
education is of importance to the Spanish CIU and EA. Interestingly, we observe an effort towards 
politicization of key national policy domains in the European arena, which occurs in parallel to 
the de-politicization of policy domains already transferred to the EU level. 
How can we interpret these findings vis-à-vis Europeanization as politicization? On the one 
hand, EP-elections of the post-Maastricht era are “less second order” in the sense that national 
issue domains are not as dominant in EP elections as implied by the second order theory. On the 
other hand, parties for the most part debate irrelevant (polity) issues in EP elections. Although 
this use of the European electoral arena is a factor depoliticizing competition, some parties make 
baby steps towards politicization of national policy-making processes in the European arena. 
Evidently, party competition in EP elections is far from momentous and politicization takes 
place only in a small number of policy areas. All in all, parties play hide-and-seek with issue 
domains (and voters) across arenas: although their discussions are located in the European con-
text, they actually debate national policy and EU polity issues, while neglecting vital EU policy 
issues. This, obviously, has repercussions on the quality of competition, in the sense that com-
petition can be regarded as artificial. According to our analyses of EP elections, Mair’s thesis on 
the hollowing out of competition seems reasonable. Moreover, if this is how parties communicate 
their political visions for Europe, voters’ indifference towards EP elections should come as no 
surprise. The observed Europeanization of parties in terms of action (Europeanization II) is only 
rudimentary. 
Finally, the data at our disposal do not provide support for Goetz’s thesis on “clustered 
Europeanization”: the time of accession does not seem to play a role neither in terms of the phase 
of European integration, nor in terms of the internal political and economic development of the 
member state. 
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5.  Conclusions: Suggestions for party researchers and politicians
We looked at party competition in six EU member states analyzing it along the Europeanization 
literature. Our analysis of national party Europeanization focused on EP elections to examine, 
firstly, party awareness of the European context (Europeanization I) and secondly, party action 
induced by this context, in terms of positioning in several European policy areas (Europeaniza-
tion II). 
Can we confidently observe Europeanization in the cases we examined? Our findings sug-
gest that awareness (Europeanization I) can be observed in various degrees amongst political 
parties: most parties examined have become increasingly aware of the European context in which 
they operate. Still, (most) political parties are not (yet) Europeanized concerning the way they 
structure their competition in the political space (Europeanization II). The present empirical 
analysis makes evident that pro-integrationist positions dominate the debate in EP elections and 
parties focus primarily on institutional issues, though, as Mair (2000; 2004; 2006; 2007) rightly 
points out, this is not the proper arena to discuss the polity dimension of European integration. 
Moreover, parties fight battles in the EP arena on grounds different from national electoral con-
tests. Crucially, the data at our disposal portrays EP elections more as an informative forum on 
the state of democracy and legitimacy of the EU rather than a political battle over conflicting 
views. 
Why does this happen? A possible explanation is that debating EU policies and expressing 
concrete positions on them constitutes a big challenge for national parties. Firstly, national par-
ties hands are increasingly tied (Mair 2000), through the transfer of policy competences to the 
supranational level. Secondly, national parties competing in EP elections are also members of 
EP party groups. EP party groups have to come up with a common manifesto for the EP elections, 
despite the fact that there may be significant divergence within them; such intra-EP party group 
conflict may have as a consequence that EP party group manifestos avoid “sensitive” or “am-
bivalent issues” (Gabel/Hix 2002, 954). National parties, when drafting their individual Euro-
manifestos, may replicate this tendency to shun uncertain issue areas, while focusing on less 
challengeable issue domains. Yet, what the EP party groups, and especially the two largest among 
them (PES, EPP) mostly share is a long-term preference for increasing the powers of the EP and 
the EU’s legitimacy (Kreppel/Hix 2003). 
Drawing on Mair (2007) and the second-order theory, if national parties do discuss about 
Europe in EP elections but concentrate on polity (rather than policy) issue areas, they debate 
issues of the first-order arena in the second-order arena (as EU constitutional issues are mainly 
dealt with at IGCs negotiating treaty reforms rather than at the EP). While this choice has impli-
cations regarding the representation channels available to citizens, it has serious consequences 
on the substance of party competition. Why, then, organize something as costly as elections if 
we are to debate just issues of common consent? To take the argument further, a strong emphasis 
on those issues on which parties essentially agree, reveals that national parties have turned EP 
elections not just into second order but into façade elections. 
An analysis of this sort complements findings of voters’ behavior in the EP elections as 
voters make their choices based on party proposals. If the voters cannot see any real difference 
between competing party positions, they can well abstain. Thus, scientific knowledge about EP 
elections can profit by combining findings on the supply side (parties), such as ours, with findings 
on the demand side (voters) of European elections21; what is more, future research should focus 
not only on support/opposition to European integration in general but also on positions on spe-
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cific European policy and polity issue domains. The bridges linking these scholarly debates are 
viable ways to understand (de)politicization processes in Europe along with the function and role 
of EP elections in European democracies and the entire EU polity.
At the time of writing, the seventh set of elections to the EP, the institution that nowadays 
is called to represent the impressive number of 492 million citizens (from twenty-seven countries), 
is almost a year ahead. These elections will take place in an updated European context. Given 
the Irish rejection of the Lisbon-EU Treaty, it is high time for parties to lead a substantial and 
honest debate about „real“ conflicts over Europe and European policies. Pro-integrationists are 
under pressure to come up with convincing arguments for policy-making at the EU level. 
APPENDIX
Table	2:	Positions on Policy and Polity issues – Political Parties Austria 1996–2004
Issue Categories SPÖ ÖVP Greens FPÖ
EU-Economy 1.84 (2.09) 2.22 (1.92) -.12 (.44) -.54 (.55)
Single Market 1.42 (1.80) 2.97 (2.32) -2.09 (2.80) -1.91 (1.82)
Environment 6.04 (3.65) 5.23 (4.30) 17.89 (8.53) 6.98 (7.83)
Agriculture EU .14 (.23) 1.59 (.37) -.82 (1.65) .57 (2.40)
Militarism -.20 (.35) -.08 (.14) -.45 (.40) -.17 (.30)
Migration 1.29 (1.15) .61 (1.60) 2.68 (1.13) -.43 (.75)
Welfare 4.53 (2.05) .41 (.62) .76 (.62) -.46 (1.03)
Education 2.04 (1.97) 1.47 (.81) .18 (.16) 0 0
EU-Democracy 5.52 (.99) 2.11 (1.12) 4.37 (2.06) .69 (1.19)
Constitutionalism 1.37 (.78) 2.50 (3.15) 3.49 (1.97) -.26 (.45)
EU Competences 3.85 (1.82) 6.63 (3.04) 1.84 (2.07) -6.30 (6.11)
Balance EU-Nat. .65 (2.03) .71 (1.66) 1.47 (2.99) 2.65 (7.81)
Multiculturalism 1.18 (1.05) 1.77 (.94) 1.64 (.81) .46 (1.03)
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard deviations
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Table	3:	Positions on Policy and Polity issues – Political Parties Greece 1994–2004
Issue Categories ND Pasok KKE SYN
EU-Economy .69 (.97) 1.11 (1.10) -4.68 (7.50) .93 (.30)
Single Market .11 (.16) 1.76 (.68) -.77 (.43) -.31 (.10)
Environment .11 (.16) 1.44 (1.90) .47 (.81) 3.13 (2.28)
Agriculture EU .14 (.20) .34 (.59) .23 (.41) .71 (1.01)
Militarism -.06 (.08) 0 0 -.14 (.24) -.19 (.27)
Migration .23 (.24) 1.13 (.23) .83 (.91) 2.50 (.31)
Welfare .03 (.04) .95 (.72) .32 (.30) 2.09 (2.96)
Education .46 (.49) 1.05 (1.49) .04 (.06) .12 (.17)
EU-Democracy 1.17 (1.65) 2.77 (2.52) -4.09 (3.26) 3.29 (.88)
Constitutionalism .51 (.72) 1.35 (1.65) -3.01 (1.62) -3.19 (.32)
EU Competences 1.80 (2.54) 3.05 (2.37) -1.95 (1.99) .01 (.52)
Balance EU-Nat. 4.43 (2.29) 7.66 (5.36) 5.57 (2.46) 16.53 (7.79)
Multiculturalism .06 (.08) .91 (.87) .12 (.20) 1.92 (1.04)
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard deviations
Table	4:	Positions on Policy and Polity issues – Political Parties Sweden 1995–2004
Issue Categories CP FP KD MSP MPG SAP V
EU-Economy 5.36 5.95 8.10 6.39 3.35 2.20 3.25
(1.61) (1.07) (.53) (.95) (4.89) (1.50) (2.17)
Single Market .39 4.31 1.39 6.45 -3.76 -.18 -4.30
(1.43) (.84) (1.52) (2.50) (5.60) (1.24) (1.44)
Environment 16.28 7.80 10.90 6.21 15.82 8.97 2.84
(.94) (1.55) (.64) (2.60) (4.21) (3.92) (3.02)
Agriculture EU .70 -1.67 -.04 -.71 -.35 -1.07 -1.12
(1.39) (.39) (1.23) (.64) (.32) (.94) (3.66)
Militarism 0 0 0 .41 -.14 0 0
(.70) (.24)
Migration 2.55 4.40 3.69 3.64 2.03 2.01 1.61
(1.97) (1.70) (1.00) (1.79) (2.19) (.55) (1.96)
Welfare 1.94 1.22 1.74 0 0 3.13 .48
(1.55) (.60) (.80) (1.07) (.51)
	 	 Battles	fought	in	the	EP	arena	 291
Education .54 .05 .07 .99 0 1.65 0
(.50) (.08) (.12) (1.71) (1.72)
EU-Democracy 6.34 8.84 6.60 3.78 2.73 3.39 3.30
(1.28) (.74) (1.17) (1.09) (.86) (3.06) (1.95)
Constitutionalism .96 1.06 1.72 .47 -.41 0 -1.98
(.16) (.75) (2.05) (.46) (1.10) (3.41)
EU Competences 1.46 2.27 2.81 8.06 -.77 2.65 -3.29
(.14) (.60) (.49) (4.95) (1.37) (2.18) (2.60)
Balance EU-Nat. -6.68 -5.36 -6.09 -3.09 -4.82 2.58 -6.09
(1.93) (.82) (4.58) (3.33) (2.39) (1.51) (4.28)
Multiculturalism 1.13 .98 .51 .71 -.17 0 0
(1.34) (.68) (.45) (.64) (.89)
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard deviations
Table	5:	Positions on Policy and Polity issues – Political Parties Netherlands 1994–2004
Issue Categories D66 CVA GL PvdA SGP SP VVD
EU-Economy 5.06 6.89 1.75 1.90 6.72 3.57 5.48
(3.32) (1.98) (2.54) (.88) (1.16) (3.87) (1.81)
Single Market 3.16 4.52 .24 2.23 .55 -10.23 3.93
(1.82) (1.81) (1.01) (1.41) (1.22) (8.08) (.91)
Environment 9.05 4.52 11.00 9.24 7.80 4.55 8.39
(1.23) (1.56) (4.11) (2.52) (3.46) (3.67) (1.86)
Agriculture EU -1.73 .70 .26 .20 1.64 -.37 -.43
(1.27) (1.22) (1.37) (1.20) (1.60) (.47) (.38)
Militarism 0 0 -.16 .06 0 -.05 0
(.27) (.11) (.09)
Migration 4.32 -.25 4.65 1.42 .54 .65 2.95
(2.14) (2.13) (3.67) (1.74) (.28) (1.13) (3.07)
Welfare 1.26 .35 .13 .67 .28 1.00 .87
(.90) (.61) (.34) (.59) (.24) (.63) (.83)
Education 1.08 1.56 .29 .58 .03 .12 .74
(1.15) (1.87) (.10) (.29) (.04) (.10) (.76)
EU-Democracy 6.98 3.06 2.25 5.08 1.51 -5.02 5.31
(2.96) (2.84) (1.90) (2.96) (.80) (8.79) (2.82)
Constitutionalism 1.77 1.20 1.00 1.23 .48 -.15 1.74
(1.00) (1.38) (1.04) (1.20) (.54) (.26) (1.52)
EU Competences 10.59 3.02 5.35 6.78 -2.32 -4.08 5.72
(4.97) (2.61) (4.91) (4.09) (4.49) (5.71) (3.59)
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Balance EU-Nat. -1.64 4.15 1.65 -1.08 -9.70 -4.97 -2.59
(1.03) (11.36) (2.11) (2.37) (4.78) (7.55) (3.70)
Multiculturalism 2.32 1.51 1.05 4.03 -.68 .35 .90
(2.83) (1.89) (.77) (2.20) (1.08) (.61) (1.36)
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard deviations
Table	6:	Positions on Policy and Polity issues – Political Parties Spain 1994–2004
Issue Categories PP CIU EA ERC IU PNV PSOE
EU-Economy 2.87 7.61 -1.66 1.19 -.98 8.06 -1.43
(3.77) (.75) (1.36) (1.53) (1.53) (.10) (1.22)
Single Market 3.67 1.77 0 .19 -.14 1.48 2.17
(6.10) (.62) (.17) (.38) (.16) (2.57)
Environment 1.82 6.98 17.47 11.33 10.27 5.46 4.68
(1.91) (2.03) (.19) (4.31) (1.04) (.74) (1.61)
Agriculture EU 1.32 1.16 6.23 1.67 .89 2.07 1.69
(1.38) (.70) (3.91) (.93) (.33) (.53) (1.16)
Militarism .07 0 -.19 -.08 0 0 0
(.17) (.26) (.13)
Migration .07 1.75 -1.41 .75 2.57 1.22 1.39
(.90) (.75) (2.24) (.66) (.79) (.94) (.83)
Welfare 1.06 4.72 1.21 2.00 2.86 4.11 .65
(1.26) (1.79) (1.71) (.45) (.80) (.76) (1.05)
Education .72 2.35 2.57 1.95 1.80 2.99 1.39
(1.36) (.67) (1.51) (1.90) (1.66) (1.74) (1.41)
EU-Democracy 3.01 1.42 2.38 .01 1.52 1.10 2.17
(4.15) (1.12) (4.59) (.87) (.38) (.09) (2.33)
Constitutionalism -.24 .43 .17 .07 -.21 .13 1.04
(1.17) (.28) (.25) (1.90) (1.51) (.18) (1.80)
EU Competences -.46 2.83 2.58 1.94 1.99 1.87 2.93
(4.79) (.44) (2.18) (.22) (.88) (.99) (2.07)
Balance EU-Nat. .25 -5.99 -9.25 -12.89 -.1.30 -6.19 -.91
(.88) (1.44) (4.08) (4.01) (.46) (.85) (.74)
Multiculturalism 1.58 8.77 4.76 11.73 1.72 6.43 3.60
(1.73) (2.18) (3.56) (1.60) (.41) (1.28) (3.58)
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard deviations
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Table	7:	Positions on Policy and Polity issues – Political Parties UK 1994–2004
Issue Categories Cons Green Labour LDP SNP UKIP
EU-Economy 10.31 .96 4.92 2.64 1.64 2.89
(2.47) (1.83) (1.65) (2.50) (1.74) (2.60)
Single Market .63 -3.41 2.91 3.46 2.87 -5.32
(2.09) (.98) (2.34) (2.03) (1.35) (5.46)
Environment 1.98 19.06 5.00 6.45 3.82 0
(.60) (1.82) (.31) (2.43) (1.28)
Agriculture EU -.83 -3.12 -.51 -.84 -.39 -1.92
(1.05) (3.18) (1.64) (1.74) (2.78) (3.32)
Militarism .48 -.39 0 .17 -.20 .24
(.72) (.67) (.19) (.34) (.42)
Migration -.28 3.13 .29 2.66 1.03 0
(.53) (.51) (1.95) (3.66) (.92)
Welfare .05 .84 1.46 .46 .88 0
(.09) (1.10) (2.07) (.40) (.53)
Education .20 .05 .10 .23 .78 0
(.22) (.08) (.15) (.20) (.83)
EU-Democracy 1.66 .16 1.78 1.69 2.28 -.61
(1.37) (.43) (1.91) (1.13) (1.48) (1.05)
Constitutionalism -1.27 .12 .76 1.02 .31 -3.08
(2.61) (.20) (.77) (.76) (.30) (3.86)
EU Competences -4.41 .01 1.04 1.34 2.05 -17.82
(7.53) (1.56) (1.78) (1.75) (4.34) (10.19)
Balance EU-Nat. -10.43 -5.03 -1.38 -4.10 -2.20 -6.68
(2.80) (4.83) (.11) (2.98) (3.08) (5.84)
Multiculturalism -.01 .40 0 .36 1.73 0
(1.20) (.43) (.51) (.26)
Notes: Numbers in brackets are standard deviations
NOTES
1 We are very grateful to Andreas Wüst, who gave us access to the Euromanifesto data. We would also like to thank 
the two anounymous reviewers, the participants at the seminar series of the University of Konstanz (May 7, 2008) 
and Juan Casado Asensio for their helpful comments and suggestions.
2 Difference may be understood in terms of timing (precedence, coincidence, sequence), of level (federal, national, 
regional, local), as well as in terms of importance (i.e. what is at stake).
3 The sources of explanation for outcomes (e.g. turnout, incumbent parties’ losses) in low stimulus (congressional 
mid-term) and second-order (EP) elections are located in the “high stimulus” (presidential) and “first order” (na-
tional) elections respectively (Marsh 2007). Despite the fact that these electoral arenas are serving different pur-
poses, electoral researchers perceive them as interconnected (for an extensive discussion of these theories, see: Marsh 
2000; 2007). 
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4 Until the last EP elections in 2004, the second order phenomena persisted in that citizens’ participation is low, while 
the winning party of the first order election loses support in a cyclical manner, and small parties do better than they 
would do if a first order election was held (Schmitt 2005). 
5 EP elections provide an opportunity in this respect, as through these elections, parties are supposed to provide for 
the link between European citizens and the EU system.
6 Dorussen and Nanou (2006) empirically examine this argument using national manifesto data. Their main finding 
is that European integration indeed reduces the range of party policy positions in national elections and leads to 
convergence of national party programs.
7 The coding scheme is similar to the one of the Comparative Manifesto Group: sixty-nine categories at political 
levels in seven policy domains (Wüst/Volkens 2003).
8 Our measures include only issue domains referring to the EU level.
9 In Great Britain, PR is used for EP elections since 1999. 
10 Each country forms one large constituency, except for the UK that is divided in 83 constituencies (Hix/Lord 1997). 
The Netherlands, the UK and Spain use no threshold in European elections, whereas Austria and Sweden set the 
threshold for participation in the EP at 4% and Greece at 3% (Muntean 2000). Last but not least, voters can choose 
among candidates on the party list only in the Netherlands and in Sweden. 
11 Great Britain uses “simple majority vote” (FTPT: first-past-the post) and Greece uses a distorted version of PR 
(“reinforced PR”), which produces single-party cabinets. Austria uses “PR with preferential vote” whereas the 
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden use “PR with closed lists” (Lijphart 1999). 
12 Due to limited space, in this paper we present data for each political system and not for each political party. Data 
on single parties is available upon request. 
13 This depends on the timing (precedence/sequence) of EP elections with respect to national elections.  
14 We did not report the findings for the UKIP as with pro/anti-Europe positions between -50 and -70 our figure became 
distorted. 
15 Hence, our data supports findings by Hooghe and Marks (1999) and Hooghe et al. (2002) stating that mainstream 
parties are characterized by a positive consensus regarding further European integration.
16 The different domains are scales of various single policy and polity positions. The relevant methodological informa-
tion (i.e. how these domains have been scaled) can be requested from the authors.
17 For purposes of clarity, we only report our results verbally. For a detailed analysis, we attach the respective tables 
for each country in the Appendix. 
18 Excluding: the category “Military” in Austria and Greece, agricultural issues in Sweden as well as some institu-
tional issues in Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
19 For example, in Great Britain we notice that parties possess positive stances in the same categories; more impor-
tantly, they also express negative stances in the same categories.
20 Findings for the latter parties also support the argument brought forward by Hooghe and Marks (1999) that Euro-
pean integration has opened up a new dimension in the policy space, where parties at both extreme poles of the 
left-right spectrum hold negative positions towards the European integration process.
21 For instance, the European Election Study contains variables that allow analyzing a sample of voters, who voted for 
the parties we investigated. Meaningful cross-country comparisons could thus be drawn regarding voting and party 
behavior in EP elections.
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